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Abstract
Software applications become highly distributed and complex, involving independent collaborating components
working towards achieving system goals. At the same time, security attacks against these applications have also
grown being more sophisticated and are quite difficult to detect and withstand, especially distributed attacks. In
this paper, we argue that one way to identify and mitigate such attacks is through the trust-based collaboration
of application components. However, to achieve collaborative defense in distributed environments, a common
vocabulary is needed for the components to collaborate with each other in identifying security incidents. Thus,
we employ an ontological approach to define security ontologies as a common vocabulary that is
understandable for both humans and software agents. Further, we introduce basic security concepts and trust
implications, explain our security ontologies (specified in OWL) that include the security asset-vulnerability
ontology (SAVO), the security algorithm-standard ontology (SASO), the security function ontology (SFO), and
the security attack and defence ontologies (SAO and SDO respectively). Trust is also examined while its
dimensions are employed to create trust-based communications used to distribute security ontologies. We use a
case study involving Mitnick attacks to demonstrate our approach.
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Introduction
Software applications become highly distributed and increasingly complicated, implicating various components
that collaborate with each other in order to achieve system objectives. Simultaneously, attackers become smarter
in creating new types of attacks, especially distributed attacks, which are quite difficult to identify and mitigate.
Thus, we argue that it is possible to detect and resist against such distributed attacks through the collaboration of
a system’s constituent components. However, to achieve collaborative defense in distributed environments such
components should have a common vocabulary to allow them to communicate with each other regarding
security attacks and countermeasures in a trusted way. For such purpose, we employ an ontological approach
that allows sharing a common understanding of information about information security (security attacks and
defences, in particular) among both humans and software agents.
In recent years the development of ontologies, explicit formal specifications of the terms in the domain and
relations among them, has been moving from the realm of Artificial-Intelligence laboratories to the desktops of
domain experts (Noy & McGuinness 2007). Such practice of applying ontologies has become a very wide and
common fact on the World Wide Web. For example, the WWW Consortium (W3C) has developed the Resource
Description Framework (RDF) (Brickley & Guha 1999), a language for encoding knowledge on Web pages to
make them understandable to electronic agents searching for information. Then, the Defence Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) in conjunction with the W3C have developed DARPA Agent Markup Language
(DAML) and its successor Web Ontology Language (OWL) through extending RDF with more expressive
constructs aimed to facilitate agent interaction on the Web (Hendler & McGuinness 2000). Thus, many
disciplines now develop standardized ontologies that domain experts can use to share and annotate information
in their fields. For instance, medicine can explicitly be taken as an example that has produced large standardized
structured vocabularies such as SNOMED (Price & Spackman 2000). So, any ontology defines a common
vocabulary for domain experts who need to share information in the domain that encompasses machineinterpretable definitions of basic concepts within this domain and relations among them.
In this paper, a number of security ontologies is given with one of the purposes to depict an overall picture of the
field of information security that covers basic security concepts such as attacks, assets, functions, vulnerabilities,
security algorithms, etc. Besides, these security ontologies might be very helpful for information security
researchers and experts. Moreover, we suggest that the proposed security ontologies could be practically justified
and commonly utilised as guidelines to better protect an organization’s computer environment against various
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security incidents. However, once we agree to rely on such guidelines, we should think to what degree trust
should be spread out and how to guarantee trust-based collaboration among different parties. Therefore, we
employ security ontologies for such purposes and verify how trust might affect them. Consequently, two types of
trust are considered in this paper: technology trust and relationship trust. More specifically, trust in the context of
information security is evidenced in two domains of the dependencies: (1) trust in the technology that serves as a
transmission medium for transferring data flow or interaction among software agents, i.e. technology trust, and
(2) trust among partners (agents), i.e. relationship trust (Ratnasingam 2005). Overall, the bottom line of the paper
is to enable trust-based collaboration among humans or software agents through exploiting security ontologies as
a common vocabulary in order to resist and mitigate security attacks. Finally, we specify our ontologies in OWL
and demonstrate them through the use of an example involving the Mitnick attack. In conclusion, we outline
directions for future research.

Theoretical Background and Motivation
Related Works
Currently, there are a few approaches that allow publishing semantic data including OWL (OWL 2007), OWL-S
(OWL-S 2007), Semantic Web Services Language (SWSL) (SWSL 2007), etc. However, none of them is
designed specifically to express security issues. Besides, there are only few works in the area of security
ontologies. One of them (Kim, Luo & Kang 2005) introduces the NRL ontology that describes types of security
information including security mechanisms, protocols, algorithms, objectives, and credentials. While it is based
on the work done by Denker, Nguyen, & Ton (2004), it expresses security related information not only for Web
Services but for all types of resources as well. Further, a number of studies have identified a lack of trust as one
of the main possible constraints in the area of information security, particularly in terms of data protection, its
secure delivery and other issues that focus on three main aspects of trust in data transactions: identity, privacy
and security (Guerra & Zizzo 2003). Although, there are plenty of works done in the every single area of
information security that somehow explores trust implications. However, none of the existed literature provides
any information about how trust might influence on collaboration of distributed parties, i.e. whether security
system (that utilise security ontologies) might be enhanced by the adoption of certain strategies designed to
enhance trust-based collaboration. To be more consistent, take for example e-business area, the research in this
area has been investigating trust implications for a number of years. And as the result, a variety of strategies to
enhance trust in e-commerce have been developed, where four of them were best suited to meet demands of the
information economy: identity establishment, third-party certification, loss insurance and legal frameworks
(Guerra & Zizzo 2003). Finally, our security ontologies are more intuitive to understand and more complete than
other security ontologies (Kim, Luo & Kang 2005; Denker, Nguyen & Ton 2004; Undercoffer et al. 2004;
Martimiano & Moreira 2006; Seacord & Householder 2005).
Motivation of Research
Software systems become increasingly distributed that involve many independent and collaborating components
working towards to achieve certain system objectives. Simultaneously, attackers become smarter in creating
more sophisticated security attacks, especially distributed attacks. In order to detect and withstand such attacks,
system components should collaborate and communicate with each other by sharing a common vocabulary. In
our case, such vocabulary is based on the proposed security ontologies distributed among components in a
trusted way. Further, the ontologies define the security concepts and their dependencies comprehensible to both
humans and software agents. Additionally, the proposed approach comprises a factor of trust as one of the
elements that impact on the collaboration among components within software systems.

Security Ontologies
Introduction
The following definition of the term “ontology” is extracted from Uschold, Moralee & Zorgios (1998): “An
ontology may take a variety of forms, but necessarily it will include a vocabulary of terms, and some
specification of their meaning. This includes definitions and an indication of how concepts are inter-related
which collectively impose a structure on the domain and constrain the possible interpretations of terms.” In other
words, ontologies allow sharing common understanding of the structure of information among both people and
software agents (Noy & McGuinness 2007).
Currently, many research works have applied an ontological approach to different knowledge domains due to
their several advantages over other classifications such as taxonomies. The reasons of so much popularity of an
ontological approach are provided as follows:
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Ontologies specify many semantic relationships between various entities while a standard taxonomy has
only three relationships;
Ontologies share a common understanding of structured information among different parties such as
humans or software agents which in turn, can be reasoned and analysed automatically;
Ontologies are reusable and able to evolve over time;
Ontologies are shared among different parties to solve interoperability problems.

Our main ontology is called Security Asset-Vulnerability Ontology (SAVO) that illustrates how attacks against
peers (hosts) may affect their assets protected by defensive mechanisms; how vulnerabilities are exploited by
threat agents in order to perform attacks; and how assets are evaluated by using the quantitative and qualitative
analysis. SAVO is the main security ontology that binds other security concepts, mechanisms and ontologies
including the security attack ontology (SAO), the security defence ontology (SDO), the security algorithmstandard ontology (SASO), and the security function ontology (SFO). Besides, these security ontologies depict
the situation with various information security-related issues and assist software developers to create the more
efficient protection against attacks and system failures in terms of money and time. Further, SAVO can be
utilized as a common vocabulary by various defensive components (e.g. intrusion detection components) in
order to interact with each other, share a common understanding of information about security attacks, and
ensure better protection. Also, SAO correlates closely with SDO, which is mainly used to specify certain
defensive mechanisms, resist against security attacks, and reveal dependencies among security algorithms and
standards expressed in SASO and SFO.
The Security Asset-Vulnerability Ontology (SAVO)
In this section, we briefly introduce several security terms used in our ontologies and explain their relations, as
illustrated in Figure 1. However, we would like to note that due to the limit of space, descriptions of some of
security concepts can be found in the work written by Stewart, Tittel & Chapple (2005).
SAVO is considered to be the main among all security ontologies that incorporates other our security ontologies
including SASO, SAFO, SAO, and SDO. Similarly, SAVO (as other our security ontologies) is designed to
support several features as the NLR ontology (Kim, Luo & Kang 2005) such as (1) the ability to specify security
information for different types of resources and environments; (2) the reusability and extensibility; and (3)
mapping between high-level and low-level security requirements and capabilities. Thus, SAVO is a high level
security ontology that depicts information security in a simplified manner especially for non-security
professionals, and its design is based upon our expertise and knowledge of information security. SAVO relates
to some research works done in information security area (Stewart, Tittel & Chapple 2005; Kim, Luo & Kang
2005; Denker, Nguyen & Ton 2004; Undercoffer et al. 2004; Martimiano & Moreira 2006; Seacord &
Householder 2005).
First, we introduce several security terms crucial for better understanding of the given information. The full
description of security terms can be found in Stewart, Tittel & Chapple (2005). We start with the term ‘threat’
(the class ‘Threat’ in Figure 1) that refers to any occurrence that may cause any unwanted outcome for a
company. A threat agent (the class ‘ThreatAgent’) is an agent that can use a threat in order to exploit
vulnerability, while vulnerability (the class ‘Vulnerability’) in turn is the absence or the weakness of defence
(e.g. error, flaw, etc). Risk (the class ‘Risk’) is the possibility that a threat agent will exploit vulnerability to
damage an asset whereas exposure (the class ‘Exposure’) reveals the possibility that vulnerability will be
exploited by a threat agent. Besides, vulnerability may also result in exposure, every instance of which equals
risk that can be mitigated by using a safeguard (the class ‘Defence’). On the other hand, a safeguard is utilised to
resist attacks (the class ‘Attack’) and applies security techniques and mechanisms (the classes ‘SecurityFunction’
and ‘SecurityAlgorithmStandard’). Now, we can proceed further with the terms such as ‘asset’ that refers to
anything within any environment that should be protected, i.e. data (the class ‘Data’), software (the class
‘Software’), accounts (the class ‘Account’), resources (the class ‘Resource’), etc. Then, the class ‘Asset’ also can
be subdivided into subclasses including but not limited to ‘ClientData’ and ‘SystemData’ (both refer to client
and system data); ‘Component’ and ‘Service’ (refer to software implementation) while such subclasses as
‘CPU’, ‘Memory’ and ‘Storage’ encompass available resources; ‘ClientAccount’ and ‘SystemAccount’ are
subclasses of the class ‘Account’. Further, any asset may contain vulnerability which is explored with other
vulnerabilities. The class ‘Vulnerability’ has three properties, vulnerability name (the class ‘VulnName’), an
attribute (the class ‘VulnAttribute’) and associated values (the class ‘VulnValue’). Then, a patch (the class
‘Patch’) removes vulnerability and is developed by a supplier (the class ‘Supplier’). Whereas a threat agent may
use a threat to perform an attack (the class ‘Attack’) and endanger the asset, it also exploits vulnerability for
attacking a peer (the class ‘Peer’) that hosts the assets (in our case, a peer is a victim of an attack).
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Figure 1: The security asset-vulnerability ontology

Moreover, any occurred attack leads to security event (the class ‘SecurityEvent’) which can precede another one
and which, in turn, has a precondition (the class ‘Precondition’) that relates to vulnerability. Such security event
is likely to be caused by a system failure (the class ‘Failure’) and it also may affect an asset and result in a
consequence (the class ‘Consequence’) which in turn, affects an asset either. And this resulted consequence has a
number of subclasses such as destruction of data (the class ‘DataAnnihilation’), an information leakage (the
class ‘InformationLeakage’), an illegal access (the class ‘IllegalAccess’) or a DoS attack (the class ‘DoSAttack’).
In addition, any asset has a value (the class ‘AssetValue’) that might be estimated through exploiting both the
quantitative risk analysis (the class ‘QuantitativeRiskAnalysis’) and the qualitative risk analysis (the class
‘QualitativeRiskAnalysis’). The quantitative risk analysis allows to estimate a concrete probability percentage.
There are few formulas associated with the quantitative risk analysis:
•
•
•
•

The exposure factor (EF) shows the percentage of loss that a company experiences if a certain asset is
violated by a realized risk. This exposure factor is expressed in percentage (%);
The single loss expectancy (SLE) is the cost of loss calculated using the formula. SLE is expressed in a
money value ($) and is calculated using the following formula:
SLE [$] =AV * EF; where AV – asset value;
The annualised rate of occurrence (ARO) is the expected frequency of certain risk or threat occurring
within one year. ARO is expressed utilizing the following formula:
ARO= Qo ⁄ year; where Qo – quantity of occurrence;
The annualised loss expectancy (ALE) is the possible cost per year of all instances of a certain realised
threat against a certain asset. ALE is counted using the following formula:
ALE=SLE*ARO=AV*EF*ARO

The pure quantitative analysis is not possible because some aspects of information security cannot be quantified
in money figures. While the qualitative risk analysis usually goes hand in hand with the appliance of such factors
as experience, judgment, intuition, and so on.
To conclude, SAVO is easily modifiable and extendable via adding supplementary subclasses.
The Security Algorithm-Standard Ontology (SASO)
This section of the paper aims to introduce the Security Algorithm-Standard Ontology (SASO) which
encompasses security algorithms, standards, concepts, credentials, objectives, assurance levels, etc. Moreover,
these security terms are classes of ontology and currently utilised as “building blocks” for other ontologies
including the Security Function Ontology (SFO).
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SASO consists of several classes including ‘SecurityAlgorithm’, ‘SecurityConcept’, ‘SecurityAssurance’,
‘SecurityCredential’, and ‘SecurityObjective’. The class ‘SecurityAlgorithm’ is utilised to define various security
algorithms. The structure of this class is illustrated in Figure 2, where the main class called ‘SecurityAlgorithm’
has three major subclasses including ‘SAlgEncryption’, ‘SAlgSignature’, and ‘SAlgKeyExchange’. The class
‘SAlgEncryption’ defines classes that deliver encryption/decryption capabilities and consists of two subclasses
(the classes ‘SAlgSymmetric’ and ‘SAlgAsymmetric’) that represent symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic
algorithms. Then, the class ‘SAlgKeyExchange’ specifies cryptographic key exchange algorithms while the class
‘SAlgSignature’ includes classes responsible for digital signatures and cryptographic hash functions.

Figure 2: The class SecurityAlgorithm

The class ‘SecurityConcept’ consists of three subclasses (not illustrated here due to limited space) that involve
the subclasses named as ‘SConMechanism’, ‘SConProtocol’ and ‘SConSecurityPolicy’ consequently. We inherit
the similar structure as in the class ‘SecurityConcept’ of the main security ontology extracted from Kim, Luo &
Kang (2005). Moreover, there is a difference between security protocols and security mechanisms, where the
former (the class ‘SConProtocol’) defines how to fulfil certain tasks using certain steps while the latter (the class
‘SConMechanism’) is an implementation of security protocols. The class ‘SConMechanism’ mainly defines
various types of firewalls, proxies and virtual machines (VMs) while the class ‘SConProtocol’ has many
subclasses that specify different security protocols being used in authentication (the class ‘SConAuthentication’),
encryption (the class ‘SConEncryption’), key management (the class ‘SConKeyMngmt’), digital signatures (the
class ‘SConSignature’), secure e-mail systems (the class ‘SConEmail’), and secure communications (the class
‘SConSecureCommunication’). The class ‘SConSecurityPolicy’ describes rules and policies used in access
control models. The class ‘SecurityAssurance’ (not illustrated here) specifies assurance methods for security
algorithms, protocols, and mechanisms. Currently, it has only one subclass called ‘CommonCriteria’ (CC) (CC
IS 2007), which is an international standard for a computer security evaluation and which is used to evaluate
security measures applied to software applications. Given the extensibility of our ontology, new classes such as
‘TCSEC’ (Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria) can be easily added. The class ‘SecurityCredential’ is
commonly used for identification and authentication purposes. Finally, the class ‘SecurityObjective’ (not
illustrated here also due to limited space) is used to define security objectives including confidentiality,
authorisation, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, authenticity, auditability, identification, accountability, and
survivability. Some of them are related to trust issues and considered to be dimensions of the technology trust
(see our example).
The Security Function Ontology (SFO)
The main objective of this section is to introduce the Security Function Ontology (SFO) that is widely applied in
conjunction with SASO to provide a vocabulary for our ontologies and for SCL (Security Characterisation
Language) (Khan & Han 2003; Khan 2005) and Extended SCL (ESCL) (Vorobiev & Han 2006b) in particular.
The classes ‘SecurityAlgorithm’ and ‘SecurityConcept’ are used as SCL/ESCL function parameters and utilised
for further analysis and reasoning of those security functions applied to specify the security interface of
components and services. The main class of SFO is called ‘SecurityFunction’ which contains six classes of
security functions derived from merging eleven Common Criteria classes: ‘CryptoSupportFunc’,
‘IdentificationAuthorisationFunc’, ‘PrivacyFunc’, ‘UserDataProtectionFunc’, ‘TrustedChannelFunc’, and
‘SecurityAuditResourceUtilisationFunc’. There are also additional classes including but not limited to ‘Time’,
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‘Probability’ and ‘SecProp’, where the latter refers to the class of security properties. The class of security
functions for cryptographic support (the class ‘CryptoSupportFunc’) is designed to support
encryption/decryption algorithms. Security functions or their sets assure certain security goals such as
confidentiality, integrity, availability, etc. The class ‘SecurityEntity’ just binds various security entities used in
SFO such as cryptographic keys or certificates. To be more precise, we provide a brief example illustrated in
Figure 3:

Figure 3: An example with the function Signed (X, K-1)

Initially, there are about forty four security functions that are not presented here due to limited space.
Relationships among Security Classes
In this section, we describe relationships among different security classes of SASO and SFO, as illustrated in
Figure 4.

Figure 4: Relations between various security concepts

As shown above, the main class of SFO is the class ‘SecurityFunction’ that consists of six subclasses introduced
in the previous sections. All these subclasses encompass security functions with the property named as
‘hasSecParams’ that in turn, contains the classes ‘SecurityConcept’ (SASO), ‘SecurityAlgorithm’ (SASO), and
‘SecurityEntity’ as values. These three classes are used as values since they define security algorithms and
standards as well as security entities such as cryptographic keys or operations. Moreover, such classes as ‘Time’
and ‘Probability’ may be utilised via the class ‘SecurityFunction’ and its subclasses in order to specify security
of software systems. Since, many security algorithms and concepts have various assurance levels and use
security credentials for access control, some of the SASO classes (the classes ‘SecurityConcept’ and
‘SecurityAlgorithm’) have two properties, among those are ‘hasSecCredential’ and ‘hasSecAssurance’ which
have classes ‘SecurityCredential’ and ‘SecurityAssurance’ as values accordingly. The classes
‘SecurityFunction’, ‘SecurityConcept’, ‘SecurityAlgorithm’ and combinations of their subclasses guarantee
security objectives predefined by the class ‘SecurityObjective’.
The Security Attack and Defence Ontologies (SAO and SDO)
In this section, we define the Security Attack Ontology (SAO) and the Security Defence Ontology (SDO) used
as a common vocabulary by software agents (e.g. a coalition of defensive components) or humans. Defensive
components (DCs) (e.g. intrusion detection components or honey-pots) and humans use SAO and SDO to
interact with each other and share a common understanding of information about security attacks and defenses.
Both SAO and SDO have the ability to evolve over time.
As illustrated in Figure 5, once a DC from a coalition detects a new attack it adds the attack as a new class to
SAO and shares the ontology with other members of the coalition. When any coalition member develops a
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countermeasure against this attack a countermeasure is added to SDO as a new class which is then distributed
among other coalition members. Additionally, many attacks especially distributed multi-phased attacks such as
the Mitnick attack (Undercoffer et al. 2004) can be detected by such coalitions.

Figure 5: An illustrated example

The main SAO class called ‘Attack’, has five subclasses (not illustrated here) ‘WSAttack’, ‘P2PAttack’,
‘DoSAttack’, ‘SniffingAttack’, and the class called ‘MultiPhasedDistributedAttack’. The class ‘WSAttack’
defines attacks on Web services (WS) (Vorobiev & Han 2006a; Stamos & Stender 2005) while the class
‘P2Pattack’ specifies attacks on the peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. The class ‘DoSAttack’ describes various denial
of service attacks. Attacks on communication channels are characterized by the class ‘SniffingAttack’. So that,
Mitnick attack is an explicit example of multi-phased distributed attacks (Undercoffer et al. 2004), which in turn,
is the subclass of the class ‘MultiPhasedDistributedAttack’ performed through utilising attacks from the classes
‘DoSAttack’, ‘WSAttack’, and ‘SniffingAttack’. The class ‘Attack’ has a property called ‘hasRelation’ which
binds the class ‘Defence’. The class hierarchy of SDO is quite similar to SAO. The main SDO class is called
‘Defence’ and it has five subclasses correlated with five SAO classes including defence against attacks on Web
services (the class ‘WSDefence’) and P2P systems (the class ‘P2PDefence’), safeguards against DoS attacks (the
class ‘DoSDefence’), countermeasures against sniffing attacks (the class ‘SniffingDefence’) and multi-phased
distributed attacks (the class ‘MultiPhasedDistributedDefence’). The class ‘Attack’ has the following two
properties named as ‘hasRelation’ (tied to the class ‘Attack’) and ‘hasDescription’ that utilises SASO and SFO
described in the previous sections. Alas, the detailed description of SAO and SDO ontologies is out of the scope
of this paper.

Trust
In this section, we give an introductory word about trust, without which security ontologies cannot be distributed
among various parties in a secured and trusted way. Trust has been studied at length in many disciplines. Pettit
(1995) makes a distinction between the attribute of trust and the behaviour of trust. Misztal (1996) identifies
different types of trust according their role: commercial, problem solving, informational, knowledge and
identity; while Kini & Choobineh (1998) make a distinction from three different perspectives on trust:
individual, societal and relationship. And as no consensus has emerged on what trust means, this paper begins
with narrowing concepts of trust within information security. Once security ontologies have been specified, trust
is expected to include high-level of assurance, reliability and confidentiality. Trust has the ability to evolve and
thus, it has different levels: technical level that mainly is supported by security algorithms and cryptography; and
relationship level, i.e. non-technical that includes humans to interact and communicate, however the latter is out
of the scope of this paper.
Technology trust is supported by security technologies embedded in standardized interaction processes. The
foundations of technology trust are technical safeguards, protective measures, and access control mechanisms
that aim to provide reliable transactions, data flows, and detective mechanisms. Trust is formed among different
parties through the use of various policies (e.g. security policies). Dimensions of technology trust may include
security services which examine confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and access controls
(Ratnasingam 2005). In other words, in the frame of our security ontology there is a coalition of members that
includes both humans and software agents. To securely distribute security ontologies among coalition members
these ontologies should be encrypted. For example, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) (Stewart, Tittel &
Chapple 2005) can be applied here. Similar to most symmetric cryptography algorithms, AES delivers
confidentiality. Then, an encrypted ontology should be digitally signed and hence, these digital signatures
support integrity, non-repudiation, and authentication. Thus, such characteristics of security services include
technical solutions that serve to support availability, confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and accountability of
any transactions.
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Relationship trust enforces governance mechanisms to apply in the form of contracts, regular audit policies, top
management commitment, quality standards, awareness training, and risks management procedures that impact
and control data flows. Initially, relationship trust came from social and organizational studies and thus, it
encompasses interpersonal or social aspects of relationships that involve humans. In our case, such kind of trust
exists among different parties that collectively assess transactions occurred according to their expectations.
Dimensions of relationship trust may include competence trust, predictability trust, and goodwill trust that
primarily focuses on humans’ behaviour. But due to limited space, we are unable to give a comprehensive report
on every type of trust, however, the detailed picture can be found in a number of works (Ratnasingam 2005;
Guerra & Zizzo 2003).

Example
We choose an example that illustrates how our security ontologies might be utilised in distributed environment
and how trust might be employed. Initially, we take two hosts, Peer 1 (P1) and Peer 2 (P2), that are members of
a coalition and which help each other to detect and mitigate various types of security attacks performed by an
Attacker (A). Some of these attacks are possible to detect only by several coalition members that are distributed
over the network and cooperate with each other. One of such attacks is the Mitnick attack modified via the use of
Web services (WSs).
First, A performs the WS Mitnick attack that exploits weakness of the TCP protocol design in making a TCP
connection called the three-way handshake, as illustrated in Appendix. Then, P1 sends a SYN packet to P2 to
initiate a TCP connection. In turn, P2 sends a SYN/ACK packet to establish a TCP connection with P1. Finally,
to establish a TCP connection and complete the handshake P1 receives a SYN/ACK packet and sends an
acknowledgment message (a SYN/ACK packet) to P2.
Second, in order to detect the WS Mitnick attack, P1 and P2 should operate as the coalition. If P1 detects the
SYN/Flood attack, it will send a description of the attack to P2’s using our security ontology. To ensure that new
security ontology can be trusted, P1 encrypts it using the AES algorithm that supports confidentiality. Further,
P1 signs the ontology and puts a timestamp to provide integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation using RSA
and SHA-256 cryptographic algorithms.
Third, A tries to intercept this ontology and modify it. If A is successful, then A will try to crack the protected
ontology which is difficult since it was encrypted, signed and timestamped.
Fourth, A can try other ways to create a malicious ontology. A can apply social engineering techniques and
enforce P2 to install a Trojan horse which helps to steal a private key.
Fifth, P2 does not know that it has been cracked; however, P1 suggests that something wrong is occurring.
Finally, P1 and P2 cannot deliver trust by technical mechanisms and therefore, they have to apply non-technical
means such as interpersonal communication channels (contracts, policies, conferences, meetings, awareness
trainings, etc).

Conclusion and Further Research
Currently, users of software applications require more features, flexibility and better protection. Hence, such
applications become highly complicated and distributed containing many various independent components. At
the same time, new attacks, especially distributed multi-phased attacks, which are quite difficult to identify and
mitigate, appear.
In this paper, we have demonstrated that only through the collaboration of a system’s constituent components is
possible to detect and withstand such attacks. However, components should have a common basis (vocabulary)
to allow them to exchange information with each other about security threats in a trusted way. Therefore, we
have utilised an ontological approach to specify information security issues in a way understandable to both
humans and software agents. Besides, we have analysed reasons why ontologies were selected. Moreover, we
have introduced various security terms, concepts and mechanisms through the specified security ontologies
including SASO, SFO, SAO, SDO, and SAVO, where the latter is a high-level ontology that binds other security
ontologies that all are employed as the common vocabulary. Additionally, technology trust and relationship trust
have been also introduced in the paper. However, this paper focuses mainly on technology trust. Further, the
proposed security ontologies have been specified in OWL and the example with the Mitnick attack has been
given to illustrate how security mechanisms allow trust-based exchange of security ontologies among different
parties.
In future work, we will develop more comprehensive security ontologies, specify trust ontologies and investigate
how trust might impact on information security.

872

18th Australasian Conference on Information Systems
5-7 Dec 2007, Toowoomba

Information Security and Trust via Ontologies
Vorobiev

References
Brickley, D & Guha 1999 ‘Resource Description Framework (RDF) Schema Specification. Proposed
Recommendation, World Wide Web Consortium, <http://www.w3.org/TR/PR-rdf-schema>.
Common Criteria International Standard (CC IS), viewed 6 May 2006 <http://csrc.nist.gov/cc/CC-v2.1.html>.
Denker, G, Nguyen, S & Ton, A 2004 ‘OWL-S Semantics of Security Web Services: a Case Study’, paper
presented to SRI International, Menlo Park, California, USA.
Guerra, GA & Zizzo, DJ 2003 ‘Economics of Trust in the Information Economy: Issues of Identity, Privacy and
Security’, Oxford Internet Institute, Research report, No. 1, Apr.
Hendler, J & McGuinness, D 2000 ‘The DARPA Agent Markup Language’, IEEE Intelligent Systems, vol. 16,
no. 6, pp. 67-73.
Khan, K & Han, J 2003 ‘A Security Characterisation Framework for Trustworthy Component Based Software
Systems’, COMPSAC2003, pp. 164-169.
Khan, K 2005 ‘Security Characterisation and Compositional Analysis for Component-based Software Systems’,
PhD thesis, Monash University, Apr.
Kim, A, Luo, J & Kang, M 2005 ‘Security Ontology for Annotating Resources’, paper presented to the 4th
International Conference on Ontologies, Databases, and Applications of Semantics, ODBASE 2005.
Kini, A & Choobineh, J 1998 ‘Trust in Electronic Commerce: Definition and Theoretical Considerations’, paper
presented to the Proceedings of the 31st Annual Hawaii Conference on System Sciences.
Martimiano, LA & Moreira, E 2006 ‘The Evaluation Process of a Computer Security Incident Ontology’, paper
presented to the 2nd Workshop on Ontologies and their Applications, Ribeirão Preto.
Misztal, B 1995 ‘Trust in Modern Societies’, Polity Press, Cambridge MA.
Noy, NF & McGuinness, DL 2007 ‘Ontology Development 101: A Guide to Creating Your First Ontology’,
viewed 12 June 2007 <http://protege.stanford.edu/publications/ontology_development/ontology101noy-mcguinness.html>.
Pettit, P 1995 ‘The Cunning of Trust’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 24, pp. 202-225.
Price, C & Spackman, K 2000 ‘SNOMED clinical terms’, BJHC & IM – British Journal of Healthcare
Computing & Information Management, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 27-31.
Ratnasingam, R 2005 ‘E-commerce Relationships: The Impact of Trust on Relationship Continuity’,
International Journal of Commerce & Management, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1-16
Seacord, RC & Householder, AD 2005 ‘A Structured Approach to Classifying Security Vulnerabilities’,
CMU/SEI-2005- TN-003, Jan.
Semantic Markup for Web Services (OWL-S), viewed 17 May 2007 <http://www.daml.org/services/>.
Semantic Web Services Language (SWSL), viewed 17 May 2007 <http://www.daml.org/services/swsl/>.
Stamos, A & Stender, S 2005 ‘Attacking Web Services: The Next Generation of Vulnerable Enterprise Apps’,
BlackHat2005, USA.
Stewart, JM, Tittel, E & Chapple, M 2005 CISSP: Certified Information Systems Security Professional. Study
Guide, 3rd edn, Sybex.
Undercoffer, J, Joshi, A, Finin, T & Pinkston, J 2004 ‘A target-centric Ontology for Intrusion Detection,” paper
presented to International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Mexico.
Uschold, MK, Moralee, S, & Zorgios, Y 1998 ‘The Enterprise Ontology’, The Knowledge Engineering Review,
vol. 13, no. 1, pp.31-89.
Vorobiev, A and Han, J 2006a ‘Security Attack Ontology for Web Services”, paper presented to Proceedings of
the 2nd International Conference on Semantics, Knowledge and Grid (SKG’06), Guilin, China, Nov.
Vorobiev, A & Han, J 2006b ‘Specifying Dynamic Security Properties of Web Service Based Systems’, paper
presented to Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Semantics, Knowledge and Grid.
Web Ontology Language (OWL), viewed 17 May 2007 <http:w3.org/TR/owl-features/>.

873

18th Australasian Conference on Information Systems
5-7 Dec 2007, Toowoomba

Information Security and Trust via Ontologies
Vorobiev

Appendix: The WS Mitnick attack

Copyright
Artem Vorobiev and Nargiza Bekmamedova © 2007. The authors assign to ACIS and educational and non-profit
institutions a non-exclusive licence to use this document for personal use and in courses of instruction provided
that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. The authors also grant a non-exclusive
licence to ACIS to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Those documents may be
published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web.
Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

874

